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ABSTRACT
This paper studies the market interactions between MicroGrids
(MGs) and Aggregators (AGs) from a noncooperative perspec-
tive. Specifically, we study a Generalized Nash Equilibrium Prob-
lem (GNEP), where players are the MGs and AGs, and aim at max-
imizing their respective benefits. MGs’ actions are the generated
energy as well as the traded energy with other MGs, whereas AGs
actions are the load scheduling of their subscribed users. The vari-
ational solutions of the GNEP are characterized and a distributed
algorithm for its computation is proposed. By numerical simula-
tions, it is shown that the variational solutions of the GNEP perform
close to the solution of the network utility maximization problem.
Index Terms— Energy trading, demand response, aggregators.
1. INTRODUCTION
In today’s power grid, energy is generated by a few generation plants
and transported over long distances to the end clients. The smart
grid aims at modernizing the traditional power grid by capitalizing
on some of the recent groundbreaking advances in information and
communication technologies. The smart grid architecture is being
designed to dynamically accommodate new energy generators and
loads. As a result, future’s power grid will be composed of smaller
grids, known as MicroGrids (MGs), in which energy is locally gen-
erated and consumed, and that can operate in islanded mode, i.e.,
without connection to the main grid. A large and distributed de-
ployment of MGs will improve reliability in power delivery as well
as efficiency and sustainability of energy usage [1]. Additionally,
energy trading among MGs and with the main grid is a potential so-
lution to reduce the operational costs as well as to compensate for
possible energy unbalances within the MG.
Demand Response (DR) programs are another alternative for re-
ducing costs at the MG and consist in modifying users’ energy de-
mand, e.g., through direct load control or through dynamic pricing
schemes. DR has been thoroughly investigated since the 60s and
it is already being used for large energy consumers, mostly in the
industrial sector. However, low energy consumers have been tradi-
tionally ignored in DR programs due to their reduced impact on the
market. DR Aggregators (AGs) have recently appeared as new mar-
ket agents, capable of controlling and managing compounds of small
energy consumers, granting omnipresent access to DR programs [2].
An energy trading strategy among MGs operating in islanded
mode was derived in [1]. DR programs for deferrable loads were
investigated in [3] and [4]. In [5], the authors studied an energy
consumption scheduling game among energy consumers. Similarly,
the work in [6] studied cooperative and noncooperative strategies
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across users to optimize energy generation and storage. The work in
[7] characterized the Nash equilibrium of the game obtained when
selfish consumers compete to minimize their individual energy cost.
The specific role of AGs in DR programs has been considered in
[2,8]. The work in [2] considered a system with AGs and utilities and
investigated the generation in each utility and the load scheduling at
each AG that minimize the total cost.
In contrast to previous works, this paper considers that MGs si-
multaneously design their generation and trading strategies and con-
tract DR AGs to equalize their demand. We study a non cooperative
Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problem (GNEP), where both MGs
and AGs aim at maximizing their own revenue. We show that the
variational solutions of the GNEP perform close to the solution of
the Network Utility Maximization (NUM) problem.
2. SYSTEM MODEL
We study the ahead planning over T time slots of a power grid
composed of M MGs operating in islanded mode. MGs gener-
ate energy by different means (e.g., oil or coal generators) and can
trade energy according to their energy demand and generation costs.
The energy generation cost of MG m, m = 1, . . . ,M , at time
slot t, t ∈ T , {1, . . . , T}, is denoted by cmt(gmt), where gmt
stands for the total generated energy in MWh. The cost function
cmt(·) is assumed to be twice continuously differentiable and con-
vex. Let vector gm , (gmt)t∈T stack the energy generated at
MG m over the whole time horizon. Similarly, let vector function
cm(gm) , (cmt(gmt))t∈T stack the generation costs. The energy
generated in a certain MG is constrained by the maximum capacity
of its generators denoted by the positive constant Gˆm. Accordingly,
the energy generated by the m-th MG must satisfy gm ∈ Gm with
Gm , {gm ∈ R
T : gmt ∈ [0, Gˆm],∀t}.
Let setM contain the existing MG connections, i.e., MG m is
connected to MG m′ 6= m if pair (m,m′) [or pair (m′,m), indis-
tinctly] is contained inM. Similarly, setMm contains the indices
of MGs connected to MG m, i.e.,Mm , {m
′ : (m,m′) ∈ M}.
When two MGs are connected, they can trade energy. Let emm′t de-
note the energy bought, emm′t > 0, or sold, emm′t < 0, by MGm
from/to MG m′ at time slot t. MG pairs (m,m′) ∈ M must reach
consensus on the traded energy, i.e.,
emm′t = −em′mt, ∀(m,m
′) ∈ M,∀t ∈ T . (1)
When energy is traded between MGs m and m′, some inherent en-
ergy transfer costs are assumed to be paid to the distribution system
operator. We introduce the monotonically increasing, twice continu-
ously differentiable, convex function γmm′t (emm′t) to account for
the transfer cost at MG m when emm′t MWh are traded with MG
m′. Let vector em , (emt)t∈T , with emt , (emm′t)m′∈Mm ,
stack the traded energy over the whole time horizon at MGm. Sim-
ilarly, vector function γm(em) , ((γmm′t(em′mt))m′∈Mm)t∈T
stacks the energy trading costs. Finally, the energy traded in a cer-
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Fig. 1. System model with DR AGs.
tain MG is limited, among other factors, by the maximum capac-
ity of the distribution lines. Thus, the traded energy must satisfy
em ∈ Em , {em ∈ R
T |Mm| : emm′t ∈ [E˘mm′ , Eˆmm′ ], ∀t},
where E˘mm′ ≤ 0 and Eˆmm′ ≥ 0 limit the maximum energy sold
and bought by MG m to/from MG m′, respectively. Note that, by
setting E˘mm′ = 0 (Eˆmm′ = 0), one can prevent MGm from selling
(buying) energy to (from) MGm′.
Let u denote the user index and Um denote the set of users served
by MG m. User u ∈ Um requests x¯ℓut MWh from MG m to ac-
tivate the ℓ-th appliance at time t, ℓ = 1, . . . , L, with L being the
total number of appliances. Contrarily to [9], which applied dynamic
pricing techniques to incentivate users for shifting their demands, we
consider that them-th MG charges a flat tariff, qm, in $/MWh, for
the consumed energy. To avoid peak energy demands at the MG op-
erator, direct load control is considered, which allows shifting certain
user loads. To palliate users’ discomfort arising from load relocation,
the u-th user receives an energy discount, dℓut(xℓut), in $, when the
ℓ-th appliance receives xℓut instead of the originally requested load,
x¯ℓut. As in [8], we assume dℓut(xℓut) to be a twice continuously
differentiable convex function that takes value 0 when no deviation
from the reference load is produced, i.e., dℓut(x¯ℓut) = 0. The con-
vexity assumption follows from the fact that users request larger dis-
counts as the difference with the reference load increases. Define
x¯u = (x¯ut)t∈T , with x¯ut = (x¯ℓut)
L
ℓ=1, as the vector that stacks the
original load request of user u. Similarly, let vector xu = (xut)t∈T ,
with xut = (xℓut)
L
ℓ=1, denote the actual load received by user u,
and let vector function du(xu) = ((dℓut(xℓut))
L
ℓ=1)t∈T return the
obtained discount.
Define Xu as the convex set of possible load vectors of user u.
In particular, we enforce that all requested loads must be scheduled
within the time horizon T , i.e., Xu , {xu ∈ RLT+ :
∑
t∈T xℓut =∑
t∈T x¯ℓut,∀ℓ}. Further constraints can be included in Xu, e.g., to
limit maximum or minimum instantaneous loads of appliances.
We consider two case studies. First, in Section 3, we study the
noncooperative revenue maximization problem at the different MGs
without DR. Second, in Section 4, we address the scenario in Fig. 1,
where MGs set up an agreement with AGs to outsource DR services.
3. ENERGY TRADING WITHOUT DEMAND RESPONSE
Without DR, the objective of each MG is to design its energy gen-
eration and trading strategy, ym = [gm, em], to maximize its own
benefit, i.e., the difference between incomes and costs:
qm
( ∑
u∈Um
1
T
LT x¯u
)
−
(
1
T
T cm(gm) + 1
T
T |Mm|γm(em)
)
. (2)
In practice, the strategy of MG m, ym, has to satisfy the re-
quirements stated in Section 2, and also ensure supply and demand
balance, i.e., gmt =
∑
u∈Um
1TLx¯ut−1
T
|Mm|
emt, ∀t. In particular,
the constraint in (1) couples the feasible set of MGm with the strat-
egy of the other MGs, e−m , (em′)m′∈Mm . Hence, the feasible
set of MG m is Ym(e−m) , {gm ∈ Gm, em ∈ Em : gmt =∑
u∈Um
1TLx¯ut − 1
T
|Mm|
emt,∀t, emm′t + em′mt = 0,∀m
′ ∈
Mm,∀t}. Since the MG income, qm
(∑
u∈Um
1TLT x¯u
)
, is con-
stant [see (2)], the m-th MG revenue maximization problem can be
equivalently rewritten as follows:
min
ym∈Ym(e−m)
fm(ym), (3)
where fm(ym) , 1
T
Tcm(gm) + 1
T
T |Mm|
γm(em) stands for the
total cost at MGm.
From above, it is straightforward to see that the ahead planning
of the power grid is a GNEP with shared constraints [10, Def. 4.5],
where each player (i.e., each MG) aims at solving (3). A generalized
Nash equilibrium is a feasible point (y⋆m)
M
m=1 such that fm(y
⋆
m) ≤
fm(ym),∀ym ∈ Ym(e
⋆
−m) for each MG m = 1, . . . ,M . Due to
the coupling on the players’ feasible sets, it is difficult to derive all
the geralized Nash equilibrium points [10]. In this regard, we restrict
our attention to the variational solutions of the GNEP, which are the
subset of the solutions to the GNEP that are also solutions to the
associated variational inequality (the interested reader is referred to
[10] for further details). In this case study, the variational solutions
can be interpreted as those solutions obtained when the MGs must
reach consensus not only on the energy bought and sold, but also on
the price of such energy transactions, which naturally arise from the
optimal Lagrange multipliers associated to (1).
Proposition 1. The variational solutions of the GNEP defined by
(3), ∀m = 1, . . . ,M , are solutions of the following NUM problem:
min
y∈Y
M∑
m=1
fm(ym), (4)
where y contains the strategy of the different MGs, y , [g, e]
with g = (gm)
M
m=1 and e = (em)
M
m=1, and where its asso-
ciated feasible set is Y ,
{
e ∈
∏M
i=1 Ei,g ∈
∏M
i=1 Gi :
gmt =
∑
u∈Um
1TLx¯ut − 1
T
|Mm|
emt,∀m, t, emm′t + em′mt =
0,∀(m,m′) ∈ M,∀t
}
. Additionally, the converse implication
holds true as well.
Proof. The proof is done in two steps: (a) we show that the vari-
ational solutions of the GNEP defined by (3) are also solutions of
the variational inequality VI(Y,F) with F = (Fm)Mm=1 and Fm =
∇ymfm(ym), and vice versa; and (b), we demonstrate that the so-
lutions to VI(Y,F) are solutions of the network utility maximiza-
tion problem in (4), and vice versa. The proof of (a) follows from
[10, Lemma 4.3] by noting that (i) the sets {gm ∈ Gm, em ∈ Em :
gmt =
∑
u∈Um
1TLx¯ut− 1
T
|Mm|
emt,∀t} are nonempty, closed and
convex, ∀m; (ii) the objective function of each MG, fm(ym), is
twice continuously differentiable; and (iii) the shared constraint in
(1) is continuously differentiable and jointly convex. The proof of
(b) follows by noting that the KKT system of VI(Y,F) is equiva-
lent to the KKT optimality conditions of (4).
From Proposition 1 it follows that the variational solutions of the
GNEP are convenient equilibrium points as they achieve the same
performance than a cooperative strategy aimed at minimizing the to-
tal cost. Next, we obtain the variational solutions of the GNEP by
solving (4) in a distributed way by means of dual decomposition.
Since (4) is convex and the Slater constraint qualification holds, the
duality gap (difference between the optimal values of the primal and
dual problems) is zero [11]. The dual problem is convex and reads
maxλ miny L(y,λ), where L(y,λ) is the Lagrangian of (4) when
the constraint in (1) is relaxed, λmm′t is the associated dual vari-
able, and λ = ((λmm′t)t∈T )(m,m′)∈Mm . With a slight abuse of
Algorithm 1 Subgradient algorithm without DR
Initialization: Set k := 0 and initialize λ(0)
mm′t
= 0.
Each MGm,m = 1, . . . ,M executes distributedly the following steps:
Step 1: If a global termination condition is met, the algorithm stops.
Step 2: Compute the primal iterate, y(k)m , [g
(k)
m , e
(k)
m ], as:
y
(k)
m = argminym fm(ym) +
∑
t∈T
∑
m′∈Mm
λ
(k)
mm′t
emm′t
s. t. gmt =
∑
u∈Um
1TLx¯ut − 1
T
|Mm|
emt, ∀t,
gm ∈ Gm, em ∈ Em.
Step 3: Send e
(k)
mm′t
and receive e
(k)
m′mt
from MGsm′ ∈Mm.
Step 4: Update the dual variables following the subgradient, i.e.,
λ
(k+1)
mm′t
= λ
(k)
mm′t
+ ǫ(k)
(
e
(k)
mm′t
+ e
(k)
m′mt
)
,∀m′ ∈ Mm, t.
Step 5: Set k := k + 1 and go to Step 1.
notation, we use λmm′t and λm′mt to denote the same variable. To
solve the dual problem, we resort to the subgradient method, as pre-
sented in Algorithm 1, that guarantees convergence to the optimal
dual variables, λ⋆, if the updating step size ǫ(k) is correctly cho-
sen [12]. Finally, the optimal primal solution, y⋆, is obtained as
y⋆ = argminL(y,λ⋆) if y⋆ is feasible [13, Sec. B.5.3].
4. ENERGY TRADING WITH DR AGGREGATORS
In the second case study, depicted in Fig. 1, we consider that the
MGs decide to contract AGs to provide DR services. At the same
time, each user contracts one AG to manage their demand flexibility
according to the specified energy discounts. Let Uam denote the set
of users served by AG a in MGm. Thus, we have Um = ∪
A
a=1Uam,
where A denotes the number of AGs in the system.
In this scenario, AGs can shift user loads from x¯u to xu in or-
der to reduce MGs’ costs. In compensation, the m-th MG offers a
fraction Γm ∈ [0, 1] of its savings to the AGs, i.e., Γm∆fm(ym).
The savings at MG m are ∆fm(ym) = fm(y⋆m) − fm(ym), with
y⋆m being the strategy at the m-th MG when no DR is performed,
which has been derived in Section 3. If Γm = 1 all the savings
are split among the AGs, while if Γm = 0 all the benefits are for
the MG operator. Thus, a value of Γm ∈ (0, 1) is likely so that all
the agents benefit from the DR savings. Additionally, based on the
number of users and their flexibility, each AG might obtain a dif-
ferent share, Γam, of the total share Γm, with Γm =
∑A
a=1 Γam.
Thus, MGm incentivates AG a to perform DR by rewarding it with
Γam∆fm(ym). We assume that shares Γam are fixed and known.
In this case study, both the MGs and the AGs are responsible for
ensuring load and supply balance in the grid:
gmt =
A∑
a=1
∑
u∈Uam
1
T
Lxut − 1
T
|Mm|emt, ∀m, t. (5)
The objective of each MG is to design ym = [gm, em]
to maximize its revenue: qm(
∑
u∈Um
1TLT x¯u) − (fm(ym) +
Γm∆fm(ym)). Note that we have included the cost associated to
the DR service to be paid to AGs, Γm∆fm(ym). We further con-
sider that the MGs do not reveal their cost functions, fm(·), nor
their strategy, ym, to other agents due to severe privacy concerns.
Thus, MG m just reveals the total obtained share Γam∆fm(ym)
to AG a. The objective of AG a is to design the load vectors of
its users, x˜a , (xu)u∈∪Mm=1Uam , that maximize the AG benefits:∑M
m=1 Γam∆fm(ym)−
∑
u∈Uam
1TTLdu(xu).
Algorithm 2 Subgradient algorithm with DR AGs
Initialization: Set k := 0 and initialize λ(0)
mm′t
= 0, µ
(0)
mt = 0.
Each MG m, m = 1, . . . ,M and AG a, a = 1, . . . , A, executes dis-
tributedly the following steps:
Step 1: If a global termination condition is met, the algorithm stops.
Step 2: Compute the primal iterates as:
MG m : y
(k)
m =argminym fm(ym)(1 − Γm) +
∑
t∈T
(
µ
(k)
mtgmt
+
∑
m′∈Mm
(
λ
(k)
mm′t
+ µ
(k)
mt
)
emm′t
)
s. t. gm ∈ Gm, em ∈ Em.
AG a : x˜
(k)
a =argminx˜a f˜a(x˜a)−
∑
t∈T
M∑
m=1
µ
(k)
mt
( ∑
u∈Uam
1TLxut
)
s. t. xu ∈ Xu, ∀u ∈ ∪
M
m=1Uam.
Step 3: Exchange the required information.
Step 4: Update the required dual variables following the subgradient.
MG m: For all t, a and m′ ∈ Mm, compute λ
(k+1)
mm′t
as in Algorithm 1,
and
µ
(k+1)
mt = µ
(k)
mt + ǫ
(k)

g(k)mt + 1T|Mm|e(k)mt − ∑
a=1,...,A
u∈Uam
1TLx
(k)
ut

 ,
AG a: Compute µ(k+1)mt as given above, ∀m, t.
Step 5: Set k := k + 1 and go to Step 1.
This defines a GNEP of M + A players, whose strategies are
coupled due to the conditions in (1) and (5). After removing the
constant terms in the objective function of each player, them-th MG
problem reads
min
ym
fm(ym)(1− Γm) (6a)
s. t. ym ∈ Ym(e−m, (x˜a)
A
a=1), (6b)
where Ym(e−m, (x˜a)
A
a=1) = {gm ∈ Gm, em ∈ Em : emm′t +
em′mt = 0, ∀m
′ ∈ Mm,∀t, gmt =
(∑A
a=1
∑
u∈Uam
1TLxut
)
−
1T|Mm|emt,∀t}.
Similarly, the problem of AG a is
min
x˜a
f˜a(x˜a) (7a)
s. t. x˜a ∈ Y˜a(e, x˜−a), (7b)
were f˜a(y˜a) =
∑M
m=1
∑
u∈Uam
1TLTdu(xu) is the cost function
of AG a, and Y˜a(y, x˜−a) = {xu ∈ Xu, u ∈ ∪
M
m=1Uam :
gmt =
(∑A
a=1
∑
u∈Uam
1TLxut
)
− 1T|Mm|emt,∀m, t}.
Proposition 2. The variational solutions of the GNEP in (6) and (7)
are equivalent to the solutions of the following optimization problem
min
z∈Z
M∑
m=1
fm(ym)(1− Γm) +
A∑
a=1
f˜a(x˜a) (8a)
s. t. emm′t + em′mt = 0, ∀(m,m
′) ∈M, ∀t (8b)
gmt + 1
T
|Mm|emt −
A∑
a=1
∑
u∈Uam
1
T
Lxut = 0,∀m, t. (8c)
where z stacks the vectors ym, ∀m, and x˜a, ∀a, with feasible set
Z , {z : gm ∈ Gm, em ∈ Em,xu ∈ Xu,∀m,u}.
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Fig. 2. Figs. (a-b) show the base load and the resulting load after
DR for MGs 1 and 2. Fig. (c) shows the trading across MGs.
Proof. The proof follows similarly to the proof of Proposition 1.
As before, problem (8) can be distributedly solved by resorting
to dual decomposition. To that end, define λmm′t and µmt as the
dual variables associated to the constraints in (8b) and (8c), respec-
tively. Algorithm 2 presents the subgradient algorithm to solve the
dual problem of (8). As argued before, the algorithm converges to
the optimal dual variables if the step size, ǫ(k), is correctly chosen,
and the primal variables can be obtained as the minimizers (if feasi-
ble) of the Lagrangian at the optimal dual variables.
The signaling required by Algorithm 2 is performed in Step 3.
Apart from the signaling among MGs, MGs need to send their ag-
gregate strategy (per slot) to those AGs that are operating in the MG.
Similarly, AGs only broadcast the aggregate strategy per slot to the
MGs where they operate and to other active AGs in the MG.
5. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS
In this section, we numerically evaluate the performance of the varia-
tional solutions in each case study, namely, “Trading (T)” and “Trad-
ing & DR (T-DR)”, obtained in Sections 3 and 4, respectively. Both
scenarios are compared with respect to the performance obtained
by the optimal solution of the NUM problem [i.e., the problem in
(8) particularized for Γm = 0, ∀m], which corresponds to the case
where MGs and AGs cooperate to minimize the total cost.
We consider a system composed of M = 2 MGs and one AG.
The slot duration is set to one hour. MGs 1 and 2 are powered
with the oil generators U12 and U100 of [14] with maximum gen-
erated energy 12 and 100 MWh, respectively, i.e., G1 = [0, 12]
MWh and G2 = [0, 100] MWh. The associated cost functions
(MWh 7→ $) are c1t(x) = 86.39 + 56.56x+0.33x
2 and c2t(x) =
781.52+43.66x+0.05x2 , ∀t, as reported in [14]. Both MGs charge
qm = 200$/MWh, which is a typical electricity price. The cost of
transferring energy is set to γmm′t(x) = αx
2, ∀m,m′, t, where
α is a constant in $/MWh2. As in [1], the maximum transferred
energy is set to 100 MWh, i.e., Em = [−100, 100] MWh. Simi-
larly to [8], the discomfort of the users is modeled as dℓut(xℓut) =
β(xℓut−x¯ℓut)
2, ∀ℓ, u, t,where β is a constant in $/(MWh)2. MGs
share evenly the saving of DR with the AG, thus Γm = 0.5.
The base load inMGs 1 and 2 is depicted with solid lines in Figs.
2(a)-(b), respectively. The dashed and dotted lines are the scheduled
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loads for the strategy T-DR under two different configurations of α
and β, which are given in the legend in $/(MWh)2. It is observed
that the higher the transfer cost is, the more the load is equalized my
means of DR. Fig. 2(c) depicts the resulting trading strategy between
the two MGs, where it is observed that MG 1 buys energy from MG
2. MG 1, whose maximum generation capacity is 12 MWh, is only
able to fulfill its load requirements by buying energy from MG 2 and
by exploiting DR. It is observed that MG 2 barely equalizes its load.
The reason behind this is that the linear component of the generation
curves, cmt, dominates over the quadratic term. When the curvature
of the generation curve is more pronounced, e.g., cmt(x) = x
2,
which is the cost function used in [8], DR offers higher gains.
Fig. 3 evaluates the total cost of the grid when the constants α
and β are varied. Since the strategy T does not perform DR, its cost
is not affected by variations of the discomfort, β; however, its cost
increases with the transfer constant α. The generalized NE obtained
in Section 4, T-DR, performs close to the cooperative NUM solution.
Finally, Fig. 4 shows the benefits of each player versus varia-
tions on the transfer constant. The benefit of the m-th MG is com-
puted as specified in Sections 3 and 4, but it includes the cost or ben-
efit associated to the MG trading,
∑
t∈T
∑
m′∈Mm
λ⋆mm′temm′t,
where λ⋆mm′t are the optimal Lagrange multipliers associated to the
trading constraint in (1), which can be interpreted as the agreed en-
ergy price [1]. The left y-axis refers to MGs while the right y-axis
refers to the benefits of the AG. MG 2 has higher benefits than MG
1 because it serves a higher load and sells energy to MG 1. When
comparing the strategies T and T-DR, it is observed that MG 2 highly
benefits from DR as it can reduce the energy bought to MG 1, which
ultimately penalizes MG 1. The benefits of the AG increase with α
since the higher the transfer cost is, the more DR is exploited.
In conclusion, this paper has studied the variational solutions of
two noncooperative GNEPs: (i) the GNEP between MGs without
DR; and (ii) the GNEP between MGs and DR AGs. Two distributed
algorithms have been proposed to compute the variational solutions
of these GNEPs that perform close to the cooperative solution of the
NUM problem and preserve the privacy of each player.
1. REFERENCES
[1] D. Gregoratti and J. Matamoros, “Distributed energy trad-
ing: The multiple-microgrid case,” IEEE Trans. Ind. Electron.,
vol. 62, no. 4, pp. 2551–2559, Apr. 2015.
[2] N. Gatsis and G. B. Giannakis, “Decomposition algorithms
for market clearing with large-scale demand response,” IEEE
Trans. Smart Grid, vol. 4, no. 4, pp. 1976–1987, Dec. 2013.
[3] X. Wang, M. Hong, T. H. Chang, M. Razaviyayn, and Z. Q.
Luo, “Joint day-ahead power procurement and load scheduling
using stochastic alternating direction method of multipliers,”
in Proc. of the IEEE Int. Conf. on Acoust., Speech and Signal
Process., May 2014, pp. 7754–7758.
[4] T. H. Chang, M. Alizadeh, and A. Scaglione, “Real-time power
balancing via decentralized coordinated home energy schedul-
ing,” IEEE Trans. Smart Grid, vol. 4, no. 3, pp. 1490–1504,
Sep. 2013.
[5] A. H. Mohsenian-Rad, V. W. S. Wong, J. Jatskevich,
R. Schober, and A. Leon-Garcia, “Autonomous demand-side
management based on game-theoretic energy consumption
scheduling for the future smart grid,” IEEE Trans. Smart Grid,
vol. 1, no. 3, pp. 320–331, Dec. 2010.
[6] I. Atzeni, L. G. OrdóÃs´ez, G. Scutari, D. P. Palomar, and J. R.
Fonollosa, “Noncooperative and cooperative optimization of
distributed energy generation and storage in the demand-side
of the smart grid,” IEEE Trans. Signal Process., vol. 61, no. 10,
pp. 2454–2472, May 2013.
[7] H. Chen, Y. Li, R. H. Y. Louie, and B. Vucetic, “Au-
tonomous demand side management based on energy con-
sumption scheduling and instantaneous load billing: An ag-
gregative game approach,” IEEE Trans. Smart Grid, vol. 5,
no. 4, pp. 1744–1754, Jul. 2014.
[8] L. Gkatzikis, I. Koutsopoulos, and T. Salonidis, “The role of
aggregators in smart grid demand response markets,” IEEE J.
Sel. Areas Commun., vol. 31, no. 7, pp. 1247–1257, Jul. 2013.
[9] P. Samadi, A.-H. Mohsenian-Rad, R. Schober, V. W. Wong,
and J. Jatskevich, “Optimal real-time pricing algorithm based
on utility maximization for smart grid,” in Proc. of the
IEEE Int. Conf. on Smart Grid Commun. IEEE, 2010, pp.
415–420.
[10] G. Scutari, D. P. Palomar, F. Facchinei, and J.-S. Pang, “Mono-
tone games for cognitive radio systems,” in Distributed Deci-
sion Making and Control. Springer, 2012, pp. 83–112.
[11] S. Boyd and L. Vandenberghe, Convex Optimization. Cam-
bridge Univ Press, 2004.
[12] D. Bertsekas, A. Nedic´, and A. Ozdaglar, Convex Analysis and
Optimization, ser. Athena Scientific Optimization and Compu-
tation Series. Athena Scientific, 2003. [Online]. Available:
http://books.google.es/books?id=DaOFQgAACAAJ
[13] D. P. Bertsekas, Convex optimization algorithms. Athena Sci-
entific, 2015.
[14] Q. B. Dam, A. P. S. Meliopoulos, G. T. Heydt, and A. Bose, “A
breaker-oriented, three-phase IEEE 24-substation test system,”
IEEE Trans. Power Syst., vol. 25, no. 1, pp. 59–67, Feb. 2010.
The author has requested enhancement of the downloaded file. All in-text references underlined in blue are linked to publications on ResearchGate.
